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What happened to the national currencies of a divided Europe after the first  World 
War is  full of lessons  for  our own time.  This first  paper describes  how  the  instability 
of  the  German  mark  and  the  French  franc  became  after  1918  a  major  political 
pre-occupation,  paving  the  way  for  Hitler and the Nazi dictatorship  in  Germany and 
leading  straight  to  the  renewal  of force  and  bloodshed  in  1939.  A  second  paper  will 
explain  the  rise  of Fascism  in  Italy  and  the  working of the  totalitarian  economies, 
both in  Italy  and Germany. 
Before  the  war 
Before the first World War, Europe's currencies were 
stable,  tied  to  the  value  of  gold,  and  in  effect  fixed 
in value in relation to each other. The system of inter-
national  exchange  worked  smoothly;  political  drama, 
in a monetary sense was mercifully ~lacking. If Europe's 
overseas  investments  were  excessive,  her  prosperity 
could  easily  absorb  the  strain.  France,  for  instance, 
could  sustain  the  losses  which  followed  large  but im-
prudent loans to Imperial Russia, even if French indu-
strial  equipment  was  largely  out-of-date  and  social 
investment lacking. Social injustice, the poverty of the 
masses, even the rising armaments race with its accomp-
animent  of  rising  taxes,  went  generally  unheeded  in 
the general race  for short-term profit.  It was-at least 
for a  few-"La Belle  Epoque",  the  golden  age. 
The aftermath of the war 
The  First  World  War wrecks  Europe's  economies. 
European nations marched exultantly to battle, expect-
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ing a short war and little foreseeing the mass slaughter 
and the years  of painful struggle  ahead.  That struggle 
not  only  bled  Europe  white,  it  wrecked  financial 
structures in every country. The vast European credits 
built up overseas were transformed into debts. Germany 
and  Austria  were  especially  hard  hit,  cut  off  by  the 
naval blockade.  But  the  allies  suffered  too;  taxes  rose 
to unprecedented heights;  vast loans had to be  raised. 
Above  aU,  the  war  was  financed  by  inflation.  Freed 
from  the gold  standard,  a  flood  of paper money  was 
accompanied  by  rocketing prices  and wages;  and  cur-
rencies steadily depreciated. 
When  the  fighting  stopped,  the  effects  of inflation 
could be measured. To take one example, the German 
mark,  4.2  to  the  dollar  in  1913,  was  down  to  8  in 
1918. 
Weighed  down  by  debts,  largely  short-term,  both 
internal  and  external,  cut  off  from  the  financial  aid 
the  Americans  had  been  willing  to  give  during  the 
war  itself,  industry  disrupted,  France  and  her  allies 
were  in a  desperate  condition.  Where  was  the  money 
to come from to pay for reconstruction and the heavy cost of war pensions? Fatally for their own long term 
interests,  the  victors  turned  to  what  they  thought 
would be  a  simple  remedy:  "The Germans must pay". 
Germany's inflation: 
the first round 
The cost of defeat 
The plain fact was  that Germany was in no position 
to pay anything. She  had lost her colonies, her merch-
ant navy, her investments abroad and her patent rights. 
Her  waterways  had  been  internationalized;  her  ports 
opened  to  all-comers.  The  reparations  demanded 
amounted  to  132  billion  gold  marks  plus  two  billion 
gold  marks  a  year.  This was  equivalent  to  two-and-a-
half  times  Germany's  pre-war  national  income.  By 
contrast,  in  1871,  France  had  been  forced  to  pay 
only  a  quarter of a  year's income.  Furthermore,  Ger-
many  was  supposed  to pay not in  goods  but in  gold, 
which  she  had  no  means  of  earning.  However,  the 
fall  in the  value of the mark was due to causes  other 
than  reparations  since  Germany  actually  paid  over 
very  little.  But the psychological shock was enough to 
cause  a  devaluation  of  the  mark  of  over  50  %, 
driving  down  its  exchange  rate  against  the  dollar 
from  60  to  92  in  June  1921,  which  led  to  a  serious 
flight  of capital.  On top  of this,  the Weimar Republic 
had political  troubles,  for  although  the  Spartacists  of 
the  extreme  left  had  been  defeated  in  January  1919, 
the  Social  Democrats had a  policy  of radical  reform 
involving  the  nationalisation  of  industry,  the  setting 
up of cooperatives and the confiscation of all  non-cul-
tivated land, all  of which led to even more speculation 
in  capital. 
This,  together  with  the  expenses  of demobilisation, 
the conversion of short term debts  and the difficulties 
of collecting  taxes,  forced  the government,  which  was 
unable  to  borrow,  to  seek  to  balance  the  budget  by 
increasing  the  amount of paper money  in  circulation. 
But by  a  paradox that was  to  be  repeated  elsewhere, 
the mark's loss of value led to a remarkable economic 
recovery,  even  if  this  recovery  in  the  end  turned 
out  to  be  a  hollow  one.  Internal, demand  became 
insatiable, forcing  every  kind of production to its  full 
capacity.  Foreign  trade  began  to  boom,  aided  by  the 
low cost of German exports in foreign currency. Unem-
ployment  fell;  big  business  prospered  and  established 
ever-larger empires. By  1922, production had surpassed 
that  of  1913.  Few  realized  that  all  was  built  on 
sand. 
Collapse of the mark, 1923 
The last  straw  was  the  occupation  of the  Ruhr by 
French and Belgian troops in January 1923.  Raymond 
Poincare, who had just taken up office as French Prime 
Minister,  thought  that  this  action  would  compel  the 
Germans to pay reparations although the other powers 
wanted  a  moratorium.  The  Germans  responded  with 
passive  resistance  and a  general  strike  throughout  the 
Ruhr.  France  was  forced  to  import  not  only  police 
but  also  large  numbers  of workers.  In  the  end,  the 
cost of occupation was little less than the gains. For the 
Germans,  the  results  were  catastrophic.  Deprived  of 
industrial  heartland,  German  production  was  drasti-
cally  reduced,  while  at  the  same  time  the  state  had 
to pay out enormous sums in strike  relief.  There was 
panic buying in the shops and all financial  confidence 
disappeared with unprecedented speed. At the beginning 
of  1923,  the  mark  was  valued  at  18,000  against  the 
dollar.  In August,  the figure  was  4.6  million,  in Nov-
ember  4,300  billion.  A  sinister  forecaste  of what  was 
to come politically was  provided by the  abortive Nazi 
putsch at Munich in November 1923. 
Though  its  end  was  to  be  delayed,  the  stage  had 
now  been set for the demise of the Weimar Republic. 
The bankruptcy of the middle classes left them seething 
with  discontent,  ready to take a  collective  revenge  on 
society.  Big  business  had  survived,  but was  obsessed 
with  fears  that  monetary  failures  might  lead,  as  in 
Russia in 1917, to a communist seizure of power. Many 
capitalists were ready to finance any organisation seem-
ingly strong enough to prevent this.  The army thought 
only  of blotting  out the shame  of Versailles. 
The economic recovery that followed concealed these 
dangers, but it did  not exorcise them. 
Apparent recovery 1924-1929 
In October  1923  Raymond Poincare  was  forced  to 
yield, in face of the obvious failure of the Ruhr occup-
ation,  to Anglo-American pressure for  a  more  lenient 
approach to reparations. Under the Dawes Plan,  it was 
agreed  to  reduce  the burden on Germany and spread 
out the payments due. The situation at once improved. 
Luther,  the  Finance  Minister,  and  Schacht,  director 
of the Reichsbank, were given full powers to tackle the 
crisis. They did so by the creation of a new temporary 
currency, the rentenmark,  one of which  was  exchang-
eable  for  1,000  billion  old  marks.  Universally  determ-
ined  to re-establish  their currency,  the  Germans  dem-
onstrated a remarkable solidarity in accepting this new 
currency,  although  it had  no  real  basis.  A  stringent 
financial  programme  was  put in hand  which  included 
a  balanced  budget,  deflation,  great  increases  in  taxes, 
drastic  cuts  in  expenditure  and  restriction  of  credit. 
When the Dawes Plan was followed  by the even more 
lenient  Young Plan,  which  allowed  payment of repar-
ations  in  goods,  Germany  found  her  financial  credit 
restored  for  the  first  time since  the war. 
From  1924  to  1931,  the  Germans had to pay  only 
11  billion  marks  in reparations,  while  they  were  able 
to  borrow  25  billion  marks  from  abroad.  In August 
1924,  the  rentenmark  was  successfully  withdrawn  and 
replaced  by the Reichsmark, backed by gold. 
Germany once more respectable 
The  election  of  Hindenburg  to  the  presidency  in 
1925 seemed to set the seal. on Germany's reinstatement. 
Social and political calm reigned  once more.  Financial ~ 
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and production was much higher than in 1913. Germany 
entered  the  League  of  Nations  in  1926  and  signed 
the Briand-Kellog pact in  1928  (see  European  Studies 
No. 9).  With industrial production high and increasing, 
it  would  seem  that Germany had recovered  from  her 
difficulties.  In  reality,  her  position  was  rather  weak, 
for her seeming prosperity rested very much on foreign 
capital  and  if  this  were  to  be  withdrawn  the  whole 
economic  structure  would  be  likely  to  collapse;  and 
the Wall Street crash meant just that. 
French  difficulties 
1919-1924 
French finances  in  1919  were  also  precarious.  With 
no  prospect  of  further  aid  from  the  allies,  France 
faced  an urgent need to pay for war damage,  national 
reconstruction,  and  the  expenses  of  demobilisation. 
There  was  an  internal  debt  of  152  billion  francs,  of 
which  121  billion  were  on  short-term  loan.  In  the 
vain hope of receiving  German reparations on a  large 
scale,  taxation  was  not sufficiently  increased  to  make 
up  the  deficit.  The  state  failed  to  inspire  confidence 
and  the  French  preferred  to  invest  their  funds  out 
of the  country.  In  1920,  the  franc  fell  in  relation  to 
the  pound sterling,  which  became  worth  60  francs  as 
against 25 before the war. After a slight recovery, there 
was  a  further fall  beginning in  1922. 
The  occupation  of  the  Ruhr  in  1923  against  the 
wishes of Great Britain and America meant that France 
was  politically  isolated,  and  there  was  a  flight  not 
only of foreign capital but also of French capital from 
France. 
Early in 1924 Raymond Poincare tried to  relieve the 
situation: he agreed to the Dawes Plan, raised the Bank-
rate to  7  %,  increased  taxes  by 20  %,  and borrowed 
from Britain and American banks. He had some success 
vis-a-vis  the pound sterling:  at 116  to the pound at the 
beginning of 1924,  the franc strengthened to 65  francs 
by  May.  In  spite  of  this  the  parties  of  the  ·Left 
triumphed in the  elections. 
Towards a collapse 1924-1926 
The  left-wing  coalition  in  France  had  eased  the 
rapprochement  with  Germany,  but  its  inexperienced 
handling of state finance  and excessive issues  of paper 
money,  together  with  the  lack of confidence  of inve-
stors,  resulted  in  a  massive  departure  of capital  and 
the collapse of the government after less than a year in 
office.  The  succession  of  short-lived  ministries  which 
followed  failed  to  find  any  solution  to  the  monetary 
problem.  By  June  1926  the  franc  had  fallen  to  240 
to the pound despite a relaxation of British and United 
States'  demands  for  payment  of  France's  debts.  On 
July 21,  1926,  Raymond Poincare was  given  a  second 
chance at the head of a  national coalition government 
of  which  E.  Herriot  was  a  member  but  which  was 
dominated by the parties of the Right and Centre. 
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The re-establishment of the  franc 
The situation in July 1926 was summed up by Emile 
Moreau,  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  France  at  the 
time. By keeping the country in ignorance of the truth, 
it has  been  ruined  without even knowing it,  he  wrote 
of  the  politicians'  conduct  since  1918.  Information 
prepared  by  the  Bank  showed  that  the  small  saver, 
whose  apparent  income  doubled  between  1918  and 
1925,  in  reality  had lost  through  inflation  more  than 
60 per cent of the amount saved. Once the mass of the 
people realise  this,  Moreau wrote, the incentive to save 
will be gone.  This drift to bankruptcy must be stopped 
without delay  if the  whole  basis of the  economic  and 
social order in France is not to  be destroyed. 
Raymond Poincare's  policy 
Raymond  Poincare's  first  aim  was  to  balance  the 
budget  but  some  of  his  measures  could  have  been 
associated with a  left-wing government, for taxes were 
sharply  raised,  a  wealth  tax  on  landed  property  at 
7  % was  introduced,  and  although  income  tax  was 
reduced,  the  tax  on  unearned  income  was  increased. 
A sinking fund was established to liquidate the national 
debt.  The  result  was  that  from  1926  onwards  there 
was a budget surplus and France's balance of payments' 
position was much improved. Much was due to confid-
ence in Poincare but also  to the realisation by French 
speculators  that for  once  France's  interests  coincided 
with  their  own,  and  so  they  were  ready to make  the 
long-term  loans  that  the  Government  needed.  The 
pound  sterling  fell  from  240  francs  to  199  within 
three days  of Poincare  taking office,  within  two  days 
of  the  budget  to  186  francs  and  by  December  to 
122  francs.  There  were  those  who  thought  that  the 
franc should be revalued  back to  its  pre-war value  so 
that,  for  example,  those  who  had lent  money  to  the 
government during the war would not be paid back in 
depreciated  currency,  but  on  the  other  hand  such  a 
revaluation would have  had a bad psychological effect 
through the nominal drastic reduction of wages.  Poin-
care  decided  instead  to  stabilise  the  franc  at a  level 
of 120-125  to the pound sterling with the arrangement 
that  the  Bank  of  France  would  buy  if  125  looked 
like  being exceeded. 
By the law of June 25  1928,  the franc was stabilised 
at  124  to  the  pound  sterling,  gold  reserves  were  to 
be  35  % of the  value  of currency in circulation,  and 
France  went  off  the  Gold  Standard,  taking  in  gold 
from  England the value  of her accumulated stocks  of 
pounds.  To stabilise  at 124  was  realistic  but the  new 
franc  was  worth  only  65  mg  of gold  compared  with 
the  322  mg of gold  of the pre-war franc. 
The massive transfer of gold from England to France 
contributed  to  the  later  international  crisis  and  gave 
the French a false sense of security.  Indeed prosperity 
was  more  apparent  than  real,  for  although  she  had 
huge  gold  reserves,  a  budget  surplus,  an  industrial 
production index of 140 (1913:  100), no unemployment 
and no  obvious problems,  the industrial structure was 
weak and geographically industry was badly distributed, 
agriculture  had  not  yet  reached  the  pre-war  level  of 
production and there  was  no mobility  of labour.  The 
French  took  for  lasting  prosperity  what  was  nothing 
more  than  a  fortunate  circumstance  and  they  were 
moving,  uncaring, towards crisis. The storm  breaks 
The crisis in  France 
In  1928  the  franc  was  devalued,  giving  France  a 
strong  position  in world  markets.  But Prime  Minister 
Tardieu's  high  expenditure  on  social  benefits  and  an 
over-ambitious plan for re-equipping the nation's indu-
stries soon converted a budgetary surplus into a deficit. 
For a  time,  a  basic  decline  in prosperity  was  masked 
by the successful maintenance of full  employment.  But 
in 1931  crisis struck France as other countries devalued 
(Britain  for  instance going  off  the  gold  standard)  and 
robbed  France  of  her  competitive  advantage.  The 
United  States  started  to  protect  its  markets,  to  the 
swift  disadvantage  of  France.  Germany  instituted  a 
system  of  import  licences  and  France  also  lost  trade 
when in 1931-1932 Britain set up the system of imperial 
preference. 
The  French  could  have  followed  the  policies  of 
Britain and the  USA by devaluing and  then  boosting 
the  economy  but  the  Government  would  not  do  so, 
arguing that France had devalued first, the others merely 
having imitated her,  and that in any case  she  did not 
need  to  devalue  when  she  had  such  large  stocks  of 
gold.  At the World Monetary Conference held in Lon-
don  in  1933,  France  appeared  as  the  leader  of  the 
"gold block" countries which included Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, the Nethedands, Switzerland, Italy and Poland, 
all  of  which  refused  to  devalue.  In  fact  Poincare's 
franc  was  regarded  as  sacred  and  in  the  end  the 
economy was sacrificed  to it,  and devaluation still had 
to  come. 
France put import duties on goods which came from 
countries which had devalued and sought bilateral trade 
agreements but with little benefit. In particular agricult-
ure  was  being  badly  hit,  finding  it  very  difficult  to 
export, and with little reward in the home market,  the 
French people were  having to eat less. 
Although  industrial  prices  were  reduced  by  20  % 
and  farm  prices  by  up  to  60  %,  these  reductions 
were  not  enough  to  give  back  the  advantage  to  the 
French  producer  or  to  build  up  the  level  of  home 
consumption. As a result, the more inefficient businesses 
went  bankrupt  and  others  only  saved  themselves  by 
cutting back production. In 1932 the index of industrial 
production  fell  to  60  % of  the  1929  level  and  the 
full  employment  of  1929  gave  way  to  a  figure  of 
270,000 unemployed in  1932.  As  usual, crisis nourished 
crisis and falling revenues meant bigger budget deficits. 
The crisis may have come late to France but, in time, 
nowhere were  its  effects  more felt. 
Political collapse in  Germany 
From  1929  onwards  the  effects  of  the  Wall  Street 
crisis began to reveal the fragility of Germany's appar-
ent prosperity. The balance of payments showed a def-
icit,  although  this  was  at first  small,  and  in  1930  the 
influx  of  foreign  capital  virtually  ceased,  while  the 
Americans  began  to  recall  their  loans.  The  Weimar 
Republic  began  to  show  once  again  all  the  political 
instability  of its  early  davs. 
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Lacking  a  majority  firm  enough  to  govern  in  the 
difficult  times  he  was  facing,  Chancellor  Bruning was 
forced  to  dissolve  the  Reichstag.  In the elections  that 
followed (September 1930)  the Nazis gained an unpre-
centented  107  seats,  and  the  Communists,  77.  The 
result was  an acceleration of the flight  of the  foreign 
capital  so  urgently  needed  by  the  German  economy. 
The  reserves  fell  from  3.1  billion  gold-marks  to  2.6 
billion. 
In  1931,  the  outflow  of money  became  a  cataract. 
As political street-fighting grew, a major Austrian bank, 
the  Kreditanstalt  of Vienna,  failed  (May  1931).  Panic 
infected neighbouring Germany, and was aggravated by 
foreign  fears  of an Anschlu/3.  The  reserves  fell  again 
to 1.4  billion gold marks. 
Despite  the  suspension  of  reparations  through  the 
Hoover  moratorium  in  June  1931,  the  situation  con-
tinued  to  worsen.  In July,  Germany  blocked  the  exit 
of  foreign  capital  and  introduced  exchange  control. 
Aggravated by a  banking system ill-adapted to diffi-
cult times,  the crisis  nevertheless continued to deepen. 
Past events had made it politically impossible to accept 
inflation.  For the same reason,  the  Government could 
not restore  the  balance  of payments by devaluing  the 
mark.  Using  executive  decrees  which  by-passed  and 
so demonstrated the failure of the Parliamentary system, 
the Government pursued a policy of vigorous deflation. 
The balance of payments was  restored  by cutting im-
ports  by  two-thirds.  Exports  were  also  cut,  but  to  a 
smaller degree. 
On  a  social  and  economic  level,  the  results  were 
disastrous.  Deprived  of  credit  and  of  raw  material, 
depressed  by  a  lack  of  internal  demand,  industrial 
production  collapsed,  being  in  1932  only  59  per  cent 
of the  1930  level.  Steel  production  had  fallen  to  5.5 
million  tons  from  16  million  tons.  Most  industries 
were  worked  at a  fraction  of their  capacity.  In  1932 
there were  six  million unemployed,  with  another eight 
million  on  short  time.  And,  as  always,  the  crisis  fed 
on itself. 
1933:  Hitler comes  to  power 
Under  these  pressures,  the  Government  was  forced 
to abandon liberal practices and become more and more 
authoritarian. The state intervened in banking, external 
trade,  and  a  large  part  of  industry  and  agriculture. 
But while the government concentrated more and more 
power  into  its  own  hands,  it  remained  the  ineffective 
prisoner of a  financial  orthodoxy unsuited  to  the  em-
ergency. 
The elections of 1932 were a triumph for the Nazis; 
the number of their deputies increased from 112 to 230 
and  they  became  the  largest  party  in  the  Reichstag. 
In  the  vote  for  the Presidency,  Hitler  forced  Hinden-
burg  to  a  second  round  and  gained  eleven  million 
votes. 
Two  ministries,  led  respectively  by  Von Papen  and 
Von  Schleicher,  failed  to  show  that  Germany  could 
be  governed  effectively  without  the  Nazis.  Fearful  of 
the communists, big business and the army were willing 
to take a  dangerous gamble  on the  unknown political 
force.  On  January  30,  1933,  Hindenburg  summoned 
Hitler  to  power. 
To follow. European  studies,  II,  1971. 
Economic  problems 
Belgium's Wallonia 
•  1n 
Belgium's  Walloon  area  is  typical  of  areas  heavily  marked  by  early  19th  century 
industrialisation  which  have difficulties  in  adjusting  themselves  to  the  decline  in  their  tradi-
tional industries. lt can  in  this  respect  be  likened to  many  areas  of Western  Europe and in 
particular  to  Britain,  since  Belgium  and  Britain  were  both  involved  in  the  first  industrial 
revolution several decades  before  most other countries.  The  adjustment  to  present  day  con-
ditions had to be  made sooner or later.  It is  interesting  to  see  how,  in  Wallonia,  the  process 
of European  integration,  first  with  the  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  then  with  the  EEC, 
hastened it,  and to some extent,  facilitated  it. 
I.  The economic structure 
Wallonia has in common with northern France, the Rultr, 
the British coalfields and other similar regions the problems 
of revitalising a  "Black Country" founded  on coal. 
The difficulties facing Wallonia are more than the average 
in Western Europe. If  we take as a yardstick electric power 
consumption, we find  that between  1953  and 1964 Wallonia 
showed  an  increase  of  only  73  %,  while  the  rate  of 
increase  was  96  % in  northern  France,  and  143  %  in 
Rhineland-Westphalia,  all  neighbouring  and  comparable 
regions. 
How far the  region has dropped behind becomes  especi-
ally clear when  it is  compared with the  Flemish provinces 
of  Belgium,  which  almost  give  the  impression  of  being 
"new country". In the four Walloon provinces  gross  dom-
estic  product (GDP) per head of population  rose  between 
1958  and 1966  from Bfrs. 50,800 to Bfrs. 75,400, and in the 
four  Flemish  provinces  from  Bfrs.  45,200  to  Bfrs.  76,700; 
thus  we  see  that  the  Walloon  GDP  was  overtaken 
by  the  GDP  of  the  FleJ;llish  provinces  in  1966  for  the 
first  time  in  Belgian  history  after  being  far  outstripped 
by that of Brabant (which includes the Brussels metropolis), 
although  it  had  been  higher  than  the  national  average 
until  the  beginning  of the  1950s. 
Industrial decline 
COAL 
Coal-mining  bulked  largest  in  the  region's  industrial 
strength  and  still  dominates  in  the  present-day  economic 
difficulties. 
As  far  back  as  the  Middle  Ages,  opencast  production 
was  already providing coal for use  in the numerous forges 
which  gave  the rich  bishopric of Liege  its  high  reputation 
as  a  metal-working area.  By  1850  Wallonia was  producing 
nearly six million tons of coal, when France was producing 
under  five  million.  On  the  eve  of the  1914  War,  Belgian 
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coal production, still exclusively from Wallonia, was around 
24  million  tons  brought  up  by  271  firms;  in  proportion 
to  population  Belgian  production  was  at that time  higher 
than  Germany's. 
Walloon  coal  mines  had  problems  of  irregular  seams, 
often  with geological  faults  and irregular steep slopes  and 
poor  thickness.  These  drawbacks  were  not  a  great  worry 
when  coal  was  mined  by  hand  and  pick.  However,  the 
seams  nearest  the  surface  started  to  be  used  up,  by  the 
beginning  of  this  century.  The  range  of  qualities  had 
however been considerably extended; there was now anthra-
cite  for  domestic  use,  mainly  from  the  Liege  field,  semi-
bituminous coal for industry, gas-coal and bituminous coal 
for  metallurgical  coking  plants,  the  latter  coming  from 
the  Centre  and  Borinage fields. 
After  World  War  I,  Walloon  coal  output  levelled  out 
and  increases  in  Belgian  production  came  only  from  the 
new  Flemish  Campine  mines.  After  the  1930  crisis  and 
World  War  II  and  up  to  1952  when  the  European  Coal 
and Steel  Community was  set up,  Belgian  coal production 
reached  a  peak  of  more  than  30  million  tons,  but  of 
this  only  68%  came  from  Wallonia.  Then,  to  help 
Belgium reorganise her mining industry, a  special five  year 
clause was inserted into the ECSC Treaty, giving protection 
against free  competition  from  the  other members. 
The reasons  for  this  decline 
Technical reasons.  Inherent in the nature of the deposits, 
the  problem  of  the  Belgian  coalfields  referred  to  above, 
increased  with  mechanisation  and  the  narrow  coal  seams 
were used up more quickly. 
Economic  reasons.  Until  1957  there  was  coal  shortage 
and  profits  in  coal  mining  were  high.  Then  came  the 
sudden  impact  of  competition  from  oil  and  natural  gas, 
followed  by competition from cheaper coal (from  the USA 
and  to  a  lesser  extent  from  Poland).  This  sounded  the 
death-knell  for  marginal  collieries  such  as  the  majority 
of  the  Walloon  mines,  coinciding  with  the  end  of  the 
ECSC transitional period. Structural  reasons.  In addition  to  these  inevitable  diffi-
culties  there  were  defects  in  the  organisation  of the  coal 
industry. Although many collieries formed part of powerful 
financial  groupings  (Launoit  and  Societe  Generate  con-
trolled 50  % of production). the industry was  too fragmen-
ted,  with  too  many  small  firms.  In  1938  there  were 
163  firms,  in 1952 there were still  136. 
The  crisis 
Thus production per miner in Wallonia at the  beginning 
of the ECSC was  the poorest in the Community. Wallonia 
produced  1,052  kg  per  manshift  in  1952,  compared  with 
the  average  of  1,443  kg  for  the  Community.  In  spite 
of  advice  and  warnings  from  the  ECSC  High  Authority 
the necessary  adaptations were  not made during the transi-
tional  period. 
This  made  the  coal  crisis  of  1958-1959  all  the  more 
brutal.  The  verdict  for  most  of  the  Walloon  mines  was 
closure.  Although  their  prices  were  the  highest  in  the 
ECSC, and  de~pite costly public subsidies many were losing 
money. Industrial consumers like steel  and electricity com-
plained  at  high  coal  prices  which  cut  t;'eir  own  ability 
to  compete.  But  for  an  area  like  the  Borinage,  which 
made  its  living  out  of coal,  the  whole  economic,  social 
and even political situation was menaced. So a new govern-
ment  subsidy  system  was  authorised  by  the  Community 
authorities to soften the gradual closure of the majority of 
Walloon  mines.  A  Coal  Industry  Directorate  was  set  up 
in  1961  to coordinate this. 
In  1963,  wholesale  closures  of the worst mines  and  the 
first  rationalisation  measures  briefly  re-established  profits, 
but by  1967  all  the southern mines were in the red:  despite 
the  drop  in  the  number  of  firms  from  100  at  t.1e  end 
of 1958  to 22  at the end of 1969, and a rise in productivity 
from  1,147  kg  per  underground  manshift  in  1958  to 
1,956  kg  in  mid-1968. 
Production was  down to 6.3  million tons in  1968,  while 
the number of miners fell  from  115,300 at the end of 1957, 
to 30,500 at the beginning of spring  1968. 
The  pits  of  the  Charleroi-Namur districts  were  hit less 
ha~d than the _others  (down  by 54  %  from  1952  to 1968), 
while  the  Bonnage  and  Central  fields,  which  had  been 
the  only  ones  to  produce  more  in  1952  than  in  1910 
were  hit  harder  and  earlier;  for  a  long  time  t!le  Lieg~ 
field  put  up  as  good  a  resistance  as  the  Charleroi  field 
and  then  collapsed  after  1964,  shrinking  by  more  than 
two-thirds between  1952  and 1968  (see  insert). 
STEEL 
The  Charleroi  and  Liege  areas  (see  insert)  were  better 
able  to  meet  the  coal-mining  crisis  because  they  have 
other  industries;  these  are  primarily  metal-working  areas 
~ased  on  a  powerful  steel  industry.  The  Belgian  steel 
mdustry, for long the monopoly of Wallonia, is  still mainly 
concentrated in south Belgium  despite  the  recent establish-
ment of the  big  Zelzate  plant  north  of Ghent.  Out of a 
total production of close on 11.6 million tons of crude steel 
in  1968,  Wallonia  supplied  more  t1an  10  million  tons 
which  can  be  compared with  the figures  for  the  north  of 
France (5.5  million  tons)  and Lorraine (12.8). 
But this huge steel-making concentration has weak points. 
Belgium  is  proportionately  (with  Luxembourg)  the  biggest 
exporter  of  steel  in  Europe  and  in  the  world.  In  1965 
11.4  million  tons  were  exported  out of a  total  productio~ 
of  13.75. million  ~ons. To  meet. international  competition, 
the  ~elgtan steel  ~ndustry, despite  reduced  profit  margins, 
has  mvested  heavily  in  modernisation.  The  reorganisation 
and rationalisation of the -last ten years has greatly increas-
ed output per worker and, as a result, the numbers employ-
ed in Walloon steel making has shrunk by several thousand 
since  1960.  ' 
But there  are other,  more  specific  dangers.  In  1953,  the 
Walloon blast furnaces  obtained their coke inside  Belgium 
and four-fifths  of their iron-ore from  the Lorraine-Luxem-
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bourg area;  this  ore known  as  minette,  easily  brought by 
rail,  had still  hardly any competitors  and, despite  its  poor 
quality,  was  still  one  of  the  most  economical.  In  the 
last  ten  years,  while  Belgium  was  having  to  tum  for 
its coking-coal to imports from Germany, the USA and the 
Netherlands,  the  production of high-grade  ore rich in iron 
content  was  growing  rapidly  outside  Europe,  particularly 
in  Latin  America  and  Africa.  Coastal  districts  became 
better  placed  both  for  receiving  the  cheapest  raw  mate-
rials and for exporting on the best terms. Recognising these 
trends  the  inland  steel  companies  joined  together  in  the 
SIDMAR group  to  build the new  coastal  plant at Zelzate 
which  began  operations  in  1966.  This  could  be  the  start 
of  a  switch  by  the  Belgian  steel  industry  to  the  ports 
in  the  Flemish part of the country.  No doubt the concen-
tration  of steel  processing  industry  in  Wallonia  will  keep 
the best part of Belgian steel plants there for several more 
years  but  the  area is  very  likely  to  find  itself condemned 
to  a  lower  growth  rate,  which  means  relative  decline 
with  all  the  disagreeable  consequences  that  involves  fo; 
employment. 
Other  industries 
Relative stagnation in steel making and the closing down 
of  the  collieries  would  cause  less  concern  if  they  could 
be  offset by growth in other industries,  but this  is  not the 
case.  Mechanical  engineering  is  well  established  but dom-
inated  by  traditional and relatively  stagnant  branches  such 
as  tramcars  and  "heavy  machinery."  Similarly  there  is 
a  long  established  chemical  industry,  with  world  famous 
names  like  Solvay,  but this  too is  based  on sectors  where 
demand  is  not  rising  fast,  such  as  soda  and  other  basic 
elements  of inorganic  chemistry.  More  seriously  the  coal-
chemical  industry  is  condemned  to  decline  in  the  face.  of 
competition  from  petro-c:1emicals  based  increasingly  in 
~nt~erp. Th.e  strong growth  of the  new  chemical industry 
m  this  Flemish  part of the country has a  stifling  effect  on 
its  ageing  Walloon  rival. 
.  Some  Walloon. industries are thriving.  Industries  produc-
Ing  glass,  ceramics,  cement  and  other  building  materials 
all  of them  big  consumers  of energy  and for  that  reaso~ 
heavily  concentrated  on the coalfields,  are still  prospering. 
But localisation of industry is also changing. The increasing 
~eplacet;nent of coal  by  petroleum  products  in  every  field 
IS  makmg  f<;>r  a  real  revolution  in  industrial  geography. 
The  trend  IS  for  factories  to  be  brought  nearer  the 
consumer,  which,  in  the  case  of  building  materials  for 
instance,  favours  the  Flemish  provinces  and  the  Brussels 
area.  All  these  factors  mitigate  against  the  Walloon  indu-
strial  corridor. 
Outdated  infrastructure 
In  the  past,  high  praise  was  lavished  on  Belgium's 
~emarkable transport and  communications  system,  in  part-
Icular  the  ext~emely  high . density  of  rail  and  waterway 
networks  (see  msert).  But  m  the  last  50  years  this  infras-
tructure has  ~ot developed  at a rate to match the spectac-
ular changes m means of transport and this has contributed 
to  stagnation  in  Wallonia. 
II.  Demographic stagnation 
As  in  France  before  the  Second  World  War  dem-
ographic stagnation in Wallonia is  at once a  sympt~m and 
a  cau~e of lowered  economic  growth  in  the  region.  The 
followmg  table shows  the extent of the decline: 
1900  1930  1961 
('OOOs)  ('OOOs)  ('OOOs) 
Population  of  the 
Walloon  region  2,703  3,001  3,039 
= %of population 
of Belgium  40.4  37.1  33.1 WALLON lA-GEOGRAPHY 
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D  Glass 
CJ  Paper and board Since the 30's, the birthrate has rarely been above 16  per 
thousand;  in  1963,  an  average  year,  it  stood  at  15.5  per 
thousand. The percentage  of young  people  has  thus  fallen 
to  a  low  level  (less  than  23  % under  15  years  of  age), 
while  those  over  65  in  1964  accounted  for  14  %  of 
the  total  figure  for  the  region.  The deathrate  hovers  per-
sistently  around  14  %.  The rate  of natural  increase  con-
sequently  is  now  only  1  to  1.5  per  thousand  (and  was 
as  low  as 0.2  per thousand in  1951). 
Migration 
From  1958  to  1966  there  was  a  net  immigration  into 
Wallonia of 22,000  inhabitants. This was entirely the result 
of  arrivals  from  abroad,  since  over  the  same  period  a 
net  total  of  25,000  Belgians  left  for  other  parts  of  the 
country.  The  result  is  that  the  358,000  foreigners  make 
up  11.5  %  of  the  region's  population.  more  than  half 
(54  %)  of the  foreigners  living  in  Belgium.  The majority 
are  Italian.  The  newcomers  are  on  average  younger  and 
have a higher birthrate than the native population. 
The working population 
Population  stagnation  and  the  nsmg  average  age  of 
the labour force hamper economic expansion and industrial 
renewal.  The  working  population  fell  from  1,204,000  in 
1947  to  1,094,000  in  1961.  Since  then a  minor revival  has 
begun but the increase hardly amounts to more than around 
ten  thousand  and  the  prospects  from  now  to  1976  show 
only  about  the  same  sort of increase,  if the  employment 
rate  remains  constant.  The  number  of  jobs  has  already 
diminished;  it  fell  by  5.6  % in  the  Charleroi  and  Liege 
areas between 1948  and 1962 and there was a much sharper 
drop in the western part of the industrial corridor, reaching 
38.5  % in the Mons district. 
Unemployment 
The  pernicious  effects  of economic  semi-paralysis  show 
themselves  in increased  unemployment.  The  Walloon  per-
centage of the total of Belgian unemployed stood at 20.5  % 
in  1959,  rose  to  27  % in  1963,  and  to  SO  % in  1967. 
In  that  year,  for  the  first  time,  there  were  more  unem-
ployed  in  the  Walloon  provinces  than  in  the  Flemish 
provinces  with  their higher population. 
An outmoded urban network 
The  shortcomings  of  the  Walloon  towns  is  shown  up 
by  the  age  of  their  buildings.  In  1961  almost  80  % 
of the  houses  and  fiats  dated  back to  before  1918  (com· 
pared  with  57  % for  the  Flemish  provinces)  and  a  too 
slow  building  rate  (only  between  a  fifth  and  a  quarter 
of  new  dwellings  put  up in  Belgium  for  a  third  of the 
population  of  the  country)  gave  no  hope  of  seeing  the 
unfavourable  situation  relieved. 
Urban  renewal  is  not  merely  a  question  of rebuilding 
old dwellings, it means also  the restructuring of the "urban 
fabric"  and  its  traffic. 
The Walloon  urban  area  is  made  up  of ancient  cities, 
like  Binche  and  Nivelles,  which  have  grown  slowly  since 
the  pre-industrial  era,  or  of  newer  towns  sprung  up  in 
haste and disorder last century at the call of industrialisa-
tion-these  include  La  Louviere  and  even  Mons  and 
Charleroi,  which  were  of modest  size  before  the  age  of 
coal.  These  latter  towns  consisted  of  new  working-class 
quarters-often  an  inorganic  collection  of little  houses-
around  the  mines  and  factories  which  were  planted  here 
and there. So  we  have a motley cheek-by-jowl arrangement, 
not  a  coherently  planned  town.  The  infrastructure  and 
services  in these  towns are inadequate. 
The low-density urban sprawl stretching from  the Borin-
age  to  Liege  and  the  valley  of  the  V  esdre  explains  the 
functional inferiority of the Walloon urban network and the 
increasingly  crippling  inability  of  services  to  cover  this 
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area.  Some old-established towns like Tournai and Namur 
sustain  a  local  role  but  there  is  only  one  real  regional 
metropolis:  Liege,  and  it  is  too  far  off-centre.  Even  so, 
the  Liege  built-up  area,  like  the  others,  is  too  scattered. 
This  poor urban  infrastructure  results  in  relatively  low 
employment  in  the  tertiary  sector,  i.e.  less  than  32  % 
of  the  working  population  in  1947,  against  38.8  % for 
the  rest  of  the  country.  By  1961,  with  general  progress 
in  tertiary  employment,  the  percentage  had  gone  up  to 
40.6  in  Wallonia  but  it  was  still  below  the  figure  for 
other parts of t!-!e  country, which stood at 44.4  %. 
Does the Walloon industrial corridor exist as a  regional 
reality?  There  are  certain  factors  making  for  unity  and 
solidarity  inside  the  bounds  of  a  territory  stretched  out 
from  East to West  as  this  one  is.  The most  obvious  the 
strong  French-speaking  linguistic  cultural  bond.  There  is 
also .a  common industrial history. Nonetheless, the Walloon 
industrial  corridor,  taking  up  a  limited  portion  of  the 
national  territory  and  irrigated  by  only  a  feeble  share 
of large-scale trans-European communications, has  become 
increasingly  introspective and dependent on Brussels.  Con-
sisting of a string of specialised and similar small industrial 
centres,  it  shows  an  apparent  unity  composed  of similar 
features rather than an organic unity reinforced by dynamic 
economic  activity. 
Ill.  Future prospects 
The effects  of the EEC on Wallonia 
The  progressive  removal  of  tariff  barriers  required  by 
the  Treaty  of  Rome  inevitably  means  for  Wallonia-a 
crossroads in the heart of western Europe--closer integra-
tion into a more extensive area. This is  a  great opportunity 
but at the  same time  a  risk. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  pressure  of foreign  competition 
is  strongly  on  the  increase,  and  uncompetitive  firms  and 
industries  will  either  have  to  introduce  radical  reforms 
or close  down.  This  was  the case  with  the  collieries.  But, 
on the other hand,  Walloon industry can benefit from the 
larger  market  of  185  million  consumers  which  is  now 
open to it. 
Trade 
The European Economic Community has brought a spec-
tacular increase in trade between Belgium and its partners. 
Foreign  trade  statistics  refer  to  the  whole  of the  Belgo-
Luxembourg  Economic  Union,  but  there  is  no  reason  to 
believe  that the  foreign  trade  of the  Walloon  part of the 
Union  has  not  benefited.  If 1958  is  taken  as  the  base 
year (=  100),  the  index  of intra-Community  imports  and 
exports  stood  at 312  and  381  respectively  in  1968,  intra-
Community trade accounting for over 64  % of all exports 
from  Belgium  and Luxembourg. 
Account  must  also  be  taken  of  the  stimulating  effect 
of the increased flow  of trade through the Walloon region: 
the passage of the  bulk  of goods  in  Belgium's  trade with 
Germany  and  France  (including  those  in  transit  to  and 
from  the  Flemish  provinces  and  Brabant),  trade  between 
Belgium  and  Luxembourg  and  a  portion  of  the  goods 
traded  between  France, Germany and the  Netherlands.  As 
a whole the volume of Wallonia's own trade plus goods in 
transit  to  and  from  other  parts  of  Belgium  and  other 
countries  must  be  at  least  four  times  as  large  as  in 
1958.  The  area  is  also  gaining  importance  as  a  transit 
area. 
Infrastructure 
Thus  infrastructure  improvement  is  necessary  to  meet 
the new,  rapidly increasing demands  of this  situation. The 
Community's  Transport  Committee  supplies  government 
with information on degrees  of urgency  and the means of 
integrating  their  national  systems  in  a  European  system. For a  long time  work in Belgium  proceeded rather slowly 
but, with pressure from the Committee, the rate of progress 
has  been  improved  in  the  last  three  or four years.  Thus, 
for  example,  after  a  lot  of  setbacks,  it  is  now  certain 
that  the  Wallonia  motorway  will  be  completely  open  to 
traffic  in  1972.  Rail,  water  and  road communications  be-
tween  Wallonia  and  the  rest  of  Europe  are  now  being 
improved. 
Industrial reconstruction 
Apart from  aid  to agriculture  from  the  European  Agri-
cultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund  (EAGGF)  and 
usefu~  studies  by  the  Community's  Transport  Committee, 
the  ECSC  High  Authority  has  contributed  to  conversion 
costs  in  the  coalfields  and  redeployment  of  workers  in 
the  coal  and  steel  industries.  At  t
11e  beginning  of  1967, 
loans  for  conversion  measures  in Walloon  coalfields  were 
in excess of 1,200 million  Bfrs.  (23  % of the total granted 
by  the  ECSC)  and  at  the  same  date  aid  for  redeploy-
ment benefited 59,000 workers and cost a sum approaching 
1,000  million  Bfrs.  The  Community  has,  in  fact,  played 
a  pioneer  role  in  redeployment.  There  are  also  several 
regional  studies  which  have  been  financed  by  the  Com-
munity.  Other assistance, including that from  t:1e  European 
Investment  Bank,  is  still  at a  very  low  level. 
The  Community's  principal  role  is  that  of  a  catalyst. 
Direct  action  by  the  Community  plays  a  secondary  part, 
but the indirect effect of encouragement and guidance, not 
to  speak  of  pressure,  has  been  in  the  case  of  coal,  and 
will  no  doubt  be  in  other  sectors  in  the  future  of great 
utility in instigating local initiative. 
Foreign investment 
Investment  from  other  Community  countries  still  lags 
behind  that of non-member  countries,  which  in  the  main 
means  the  USA.  Belgium  has  given  a  warm  welcome  to 
foreign  capital. It is  a  valuable supplement to local financ-
ing  and can enjoy the  same  regional  assistance  as  granted 
to  domestic  capital.  It has  not,  however,  brought  much 
benefit  to  Wallonia  itself.  Out  of  nearly  80,000  million 
Bfrs.  invested  in  Belgium  between  1959  and  1968,  the 
four provinces  under study have received  only  16,000 mil-
lion  Bfrs.,  about 20  %. 
Belgian government aid 
While  valuable,  foreign  investment  is  thus  not  a  key 
factor  and  the  economic  future  of  the  region  must  lie 
principally in the hands of its inhabitants. 
Belgian  government aid  (Acts  passed  in  1959-1966)  con-
sists  of interest rebates,  i.e.  subsidies  to cover part of the 
interest on loans to firms;  a  supplementary, state guarantee 
for loans raised; capital subsidies which may take the place 
of interest rebates  for an equivalent amount,  the  subsidies 
being  proportionate  to  the  investing  firms'  own  capital 
contributions, so as to avert the temptation of a  dangerous 
degree of indebtedness; various tax concessions. 
From  1959  to  1967  inclusive,  Wallonia  received  credits 
amounting  to  nearly  32,000  million  Bfrs.  (over  38  % of 
the  national  total),  and  68,600  million  Bfrs.  (39.5  % of 
the  total)  was  invested  with  contributions  from  various 
state regional aid schemes. With approximately two-fifths of 
state  aid,  Wallonia  received  a  slightly  larger  share  e1an 
the proportion it represents of the population. 
Modernisation 
Better  backing  from  the public  authorities  does  not do 
away  with  the  need  for  firms  to  modernise  themselves, 
making better use of the space available to them, realigning 
production on new  requirements and merging assets. 
More space has been provided for industry on new indu-
strial  estates.  About twenty  of these  have  been  opened  in 
the  Walloon  industrial  corridor  and  in  the  adjacent  part 
of western  Hainaut (see  insert).  They  provide  better  con-
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ditions  for  industrial  expansion,  with  extensive  acreages 
and better transport facilities. 
Modernisation of production is very marked in the matter 
of  fuel  and  power.  Power consumption  is  adapting  itself 
to  the  decline  of the  collieries,  with  oil  and  natural  gas, 
the  main  successors  to  coal.  Antwerp  refineries  are  still 
the  main  suppliers  of  petroleum  products  but  in  two 
years time  the new refinery  built at Feluy by Standard Oil 
of California  will  come  on  stream.  This  and  the  French 
refinery at Valenciennes will bring down power costs in the 
whole  of Hainaut.  Dutch  natural  gas,  which  by  the  first 
quarter of 1969  was  supplying  40  % of gas  consumed in 
Belgium, is  available in western Hainaut and in the Namur 
and Liege areas. 
Belgium  is  also  turning  to  nuclear  energy  (see  insert). 
The Franco-Belgian power station at Chooz, with a  Belgian 
share  of  130  MW,  is  already  supplying  the  power  grid 
in  southern  Wallonia.  A  big  new  800  MW atomic  power 
station  at  Tihange  near  Huy  on  the  Meuse  is  due  to 
begin  supplying electricity at the end of 1972. 
This  looking  to  the  future  is  to  be  seen  also  in  manu-
facturing  industry.  In non-ferrous metals,  Wallonia  is  now 
adding  aluminium  to  its  other  metals  and  the  new  trend 
will  be  strengthened  when  the  smelter  at  Amay,  east  of 
Huy,  comes  into  operation  around  1972  with  a  capacity 
of 60,000  tons  a  year.  Still  more important is  the  turning 
of  capital  goods  manufacture  towards  new  lines  like 
nuclear  engineering.  Belgian  electrical  engineering,  now 
as  before centring  around Charleroi, is  beginning to move 
into  the  field  of  electronics.  In  aerospace  the  recent 
link-up  of  the  Frenc:1  firm  Dassault  and  Fokker  of  the 
Netherlands,  with  German and  US  interests  automatically 
involved,  in the  joint control  of the  Belgian  SABCA,  will 
upgrade  the  modest  Gosselies  workshops  (near  Charleroi) 
into a  centre capable of making an important contribution 
to  a  wider  western European group. 
In chemicals too, changes are taking place. Solvay plants 
are  getting  ethylene  from  Antwerp  by  pipeline.  The  new 
refinery  at Feluy  will  considerably  improve  the  prospects 
for  the  petro-chemical  industry  in  Wallonia,  and  allied 
industry-rubber manufacture for instance-is also  surging 
ahead. 
Relations between  regions 
Traditional ideas  on  the exclusive  nature of competition 
have  become  obsolete,  and  Wallonia  today  is  benefiting 
from the dynamic growth of the neighbouring regions. 
Fortunately the facts are becoming better known, although 
the  antagonism  between  Walloons  and Flemings  continues 
to  raise  passions  and  consequently  confuses  the  issues. 
Economic  development  in  Wallonia  will  create  trade  for 
Flemish  ports;  a  quarter  of  the  goods  handled  in  the 
port of  Antwerp  comes  from  Wallonia  and  the  fates  of 
Liege  and  Antwerp  are  linked.  Furthermore, industrialisa-
tion  in  the  Flemish  provinces  can  mean  for  the  Walloon 
industrial corridor not only the supply of new raw materials 
but  also  new  orders  for  capital  goods. 
Even the rural areas of the Ardennes and the surrounding 
countries  could  acquire  a  new  raison  d' etre  both  as  a 
reserve  supply  of water-the last  remaining  in  Belgium-
for the towns  and industries  and as  a  recreational reserve 
of  greenery,  quiet  and  unpolluted  air  for  those  living  in 
congested  areas  round  about.  But  here  again,  developing 
natural resources  in the Ardennes will  need  to  be  planned 
not  just  in  the  Belgian  context  but  in  that  also  of  the 
neighbouring  French  and  Luxembourg  areas.  The  project 
for  a  town  to  house  atomic  scientists  at  Wellin  is  an 
example of what could  be done. 
Present-day  Wallonia  is  living  through  a  crucial  period 
of its  history.  The region's  past is  both a  liability  and a 
source of wealth. There are big  delays  to be made up for, 
but  a  new  awareness  is  arising,  giving  grounds  for  hope 
that  the  necessary  efforts  will  be  forthcoming.  Wallonia 
can win a  future as  brilliant as its past if it can overcome 
its  provincial  and  national  confines  and  look  upon  com-
petition not as a danger but as a  stimulus. The  textile  industry 
and  the  EEC 
•  1n 
European  studies,  11,  1971. 
Britain 
The textile industry is one of the oldest and largest industries in Britain and the European 
Community.  The  textile  work  force  in  the  EEC  of  almost  1,600,000  people  and  in  the 
UK of over 600,000  people  represents  about 8%  of total  employment in  the  manufacturing 
industries of these  countries.  The EEC is  the  world's  largest  exporter of textiles and clothing 
whilst  the  UK,  after  Japan,  is  the  third  largest.  However,  the  industry  is  coming  to  face 
increasing  problems,  the  result  of the  outdated  organisation  of production,  a  deteriorating 
foreign  trade  position and the  slow growth of domestic  consumption of textiles. 
Consequently it is  increasingly characterised as  a declining industry. 
Composition  of the  textile  industry 
The support branches of the textile industry are classified 
either by the main fibre  they  use,  for  instance  t:1e  cotton, 
wool  and  jute  industries,  or  by  the  main  process  they 
employ,  for  instance  knitting  and  textile  finishing.  There 
are however two main forces  which are gradually blurring 
the  distinctions  between  branches. 
Firstly there  has  been  wide  spread  substitution  of man-
made  for  natural  fibres.  Artificial  and  synthetic  fibres  1, 
very often  more  versatile  and cheaper than  natural fibres, 
are  produced  in  long  continuous  filaments  which  can 
either be  directly  woven  or knitted  into  cloth  or first  cut 
up  and  then  spun  into  yam.  They  can  also  be  mixed 
with  natural  fibres  as  for  instance  in  polyester  cotton. 
Secondly, the leading firms  in the industry are now thinking 
more  in  terms  of  markets  than  production;  they  might 
be  for  instance  active  both  in  weaving  and  knitting  in 
order to be able to react swiftly to fashion changes. 
As barriers between branches are eroded, so, too, though 
to  a  lesser  extent,  t
1-ey  are  becoming  less  clear  between 
textiles and its principal supplier industry:  man-made fibres 
and customer industry clothing. These three industries have 
a  close  identity  of  interests  since  nearly  all  man-made 
fibre  production  is  destined  for  textiles  and  about half  of 
the  textile  industry's  output  of  cloth  goes  into  clothing. 
Another quarter of this  output is  made up into household 
textiles, whilst the remaining quarter goes to other industries 
for  uses  such  as  conveyor  belting  or  upholstering  and 
sacking. 
A  brief history 
The  inventions  in  eighteenth  century  England  of  Har-
greaves,  Crompton  and  Arkwright  in  spinning  and  Kay 
and  Cartwright  in  weaving  paved  the  way  for  the  trans-
formation of the cotton and wool industries from domestic 
to  factory  production  and  for  the  industrial  revolution  in 
Britain.  By  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  when  the  industry 
had  spread  to  Europe,  Britain  dominated  world  textile 
and  clothing  exports  (mostly  in  cotton).  At  the  tum  of 
the  century  textiles  accounted  for  about  20  per  cent  of 
manufacturing  production  in  Europe  and  40  per  cent  of 
world  trade  in  manufactures.  Of  world  textile  exports 
Britain  accounted  for  50  per cent  and  France,  Germany, 
Italy, Belgium  and  the  Netherlands for about 35  per cent. 
The volume  of  British  exports,  at  its  highest  ever  just 
1  Artificial  (or  cellulosic)  fibres  such  as  rayon  and  acetate  are 
produced  from  the  base  of  vegetable  matter  such  as  wood  pulp.  The 
newer  and  often  more  expensive  synthetic  fibres  such  as  nylon  and 
polyester  are  made  from  a  petrochemical  base. 
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before  the  First  World  War,  began  to  decline  as  the 
development  of  textile  industries  in  Japan,  China  and 
India  began  to  affect  export  markets  in  Asia.  Exports 
from  mainland  Europe  continued  to  grow  until  the  late 
1920s,  even  though collectively they  never approached Bri-
tain's  1913  level.  The  depression  years  of  the  1930s, 
followed  by  the  Second  World  War,  caused  a  violent 
contraction of world trade in textiles, as  in other products, 
and a  further  impetus  for developing  countries  to  achieve 
self-sufficiency in textiles. 
There  was  a  brief  post-war  boom  in  world  trading 
conditions from which the British textile industry was  better 
able to profit than the badly-damaged industries of Western 
Europe.  After the  1952  trade recession,  British production 
and  exports  resumed  their  long  decline.  Conversely  the 
EEC countries-to-be, less dependent on the declining market 
provided  by  developing  countries  and  with  more  modern 
machinery,  increased  production  and  exports  during  the 
1950s.  By  1957  they  accounted  for  19  per cent  of world 
exports  of  textiles  and  clothing  against  Britain's  18  per 
cent. Though reduced from the levels of sixty years before, 
these  shares were still impressive. 
Developments since 1958 
Output  and  employment 
In  1958,  the  year  of the  creation  of  the  EEC,  textiles 
accounted  for  about  7  to  8  per  cent  of  the  value  of 
output  (value  added)  and  10  to  11  per  cent  of  the  total 
employment  of  the  manufacturing  industries  of  the  EEC 
and UK. By  1968  these shares had fallen  to about 6 and 8 
per cent respectively. 
Employment in  the  textile industry,  1958 and 1968 
(thousands) 
1958  1968 
Germany  607  489 
France  518  402 
Italy  481  466 
Belgium  172  138 
Netherlands  103  73 
Total  EEC  1,881  1,568 
UK  815  659 
Source:  OECD,  Labour  Force  Statistics  1957-1968;  UK  Report  of 
the  Census  of Production for  1958;  Board of Trade Journal,  December 
31,  1969. These  small  percentage  falls  in  employment  are  very 
large  in  absolute  terms:  more  than  300,000  jobs  were 
lost  in  the  EEC  and  more  than  150,000  in  the  UK  in 
ten  years,  a  loss  representing  about  one  quarter  of  the 
jobs  available  in  1958.  Employment  losses  have  been  in 
the  spinning  and  weaving  branches:  about  two-thirds  of 
the  reduction  in  jobs  is  accounted  for  by  the  cotton 
industry;  in  the  UK  the  cotton  industry's  labour  force 
was  reduced  by  47  per  cent  in  ten  years.  Knitting  on 
the other hand made some modest employment gains during 
the  period,  due  to  some  shift  in  demand  from  woven  to 
knitted clothing. Employment gains have however probably 
come  to  a  halt in  this  branch. 
Improvements  in  the  productivity  of  the  labour  force 
since  1958  have  meant  that  production  trends  have  not 
been  as  poor as  employment trends.  However,  the  picture 
is  one  of stagnation  in several  branches. 
Indexes of production of some major textile  goods  in  1968 
(1958=100) 
EEC  UK 
Fabrics:  Cotton  82  51 
Wool  110  85 
Man-made a 
fibres  187  94 
Jute  71  82 
Knitwear  203  171 
Carpets  164  151 
a  Excluding  ltalj. 
Source:  UK monthly  digest  of statistics. 
In  the  EEC  since  the  early  1960s  there  has  been  a 
marked decline  in production  of yarn  and  cloth of cotton 
and hard fibres  Gute,  linen, etc.); the decline in wool textile 
production  has  been  less  marked  and,  in  Italy,  it  has 
even  increased.  The only spun and woven fibres  to exper-
ience  sustained  production  growth  have  been  synt:1etics; 
artificial  fibre  production has  generally  remained  stagnant. 
The  growth  in  synthetics  virtually  equals  the  decline  in 
cotton. 
In the UK there has  been an extremely rapid decline  in 
spun and woven cotton production; wool textile production 
has  remained  more  or  less  stagnant  whilst  in  man-made 
fibres  the  rise  in  synthetic  production  has  failed  to  offset 
the  fall  in artificial  production.  In  both  the  EEC and the 
UK,  production  in  the  knitting  and  carpet  industries  has 
risen  appreciably;  the  volume  of  knitted  output  doubled 
approximately in  ten  years.  The following  sections  discuss 
some  of  the  factors  underlying  the  performance  of  the 
textile industry. 
Structure 
The textile industry is characterised by the small average 
size  of  its  firms  and  production  units.  One  in  five  of 
the  EEC's  textile  firms  employs  less  than  ten  workers. 
The ten largest textile firms  in Germany, France, Italy and 
Belgium  account  for  only  about  10  per  cent  of  the 
industry's  work  force.  The  Dutch  and  British  record,  at 
about 30 per cent,  is  rather better and commensurate with 
the  US;  it reflects  a  real  development towards  large  firms 
operating in  several  textile  branches  simultaneously. 
The  small-firm  structure  is  largely  a  historical  legacy. 
(This  is  particularly  true  of  cotton  as  the  oldest  and 
largest  former  exporting  branch  of  textiles.)  Production 
for export to distant, often fairly primitive markets, meant 
specialisation  in  production  whilst  marketing  was  handled 
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by  outside  merchants.  Today the markets  are  generally in 
high-income  countries,  where  the  volatility  of  fashions 
requires  quick  reactions  from  all  stages  of  L:e  industry. 
This  can  best  be  achieved  by  united  decision-making  of 
firms  in  which  several  stages  of manufacture, for  instance 
spinning,  weaving  and finishing,  are ..  vertically  integrated" 
in  one  company.  There are  further  advantages  from  inte-
gration,  this  time  .. horizontal  integration",  or the  size  of 
firms  at  a  given  stage  of  manufacture.  Only  the  larger 
units  can  achieve  the  scale  of production  necessary  with 
modern  methods  to  achieve  lowest  costs.  Moreover,  large 
firms,  whether  horizontally  or  vertically  integrated,  have 
· greater  financial  strength  and  investment  resources,  and 
greater  bargaining  power  with  supplier  or customer  indu-
stries. 
Production  problems 
Improvements in efficiency  and technology  in the textile 
industry have matched those of the rest of the manufactur-
ing  industry.  Nevertheless,  serious  problems  of inefficiency 
and threats to the continuance of this improvement remain, 
largely, yet again, the result of the historical legacy.  Large 
numbers of small firms  using outdated equipment prejudice 
the  health  of  the  rest  of  the  industry.  A  particularly 
high proportion of British machinery is  outmoded as  there 
was  less  p:1ysical  destruction  during  the  war  than  in  the 
EEC,  and  as  the  cotton  industry's  comparatively  rapid 
rate of contraction  has  made  the  climate  for  new  invest-
ment  particularly  unfavourable. 
In  this  way  the  larger  firms  have  not  always  been 
able  to  use  their  newer  equipment  to  full  capacity-
profitability requires the operation of most modern machin-
ery  for  24  hours  a  day  and  5  to  7  days  a  week.  The 
consequent effect  on their profits means  fewer  funds  avail-
able  for  re-investment  and  the  failure  to  re-invest  gives 
the  small firms  an extra lease  of life.  Large  scale imports 
of low-cost  textiles  can  also,  the industry  maintains,  rein-
force  this  vicious  circle  of  low  profits  and  low  invest-
ment. 
The  industry  also  has,  paradoxically,  labour  problems. 
Its bad employment record has led to difficulties in attract-
ing  young  recruits. It is  also  experiencing  more  and more 
competition  for  labour  from  new  industries  which  are 
moving into textile areas. There is  a particular problem of 
manning the nightshift and some companies rely extensively 
on immigrant labour to  assure  the  round-the-clock  opera-
tion  of equipment. 
Foreign  trade 
UK and EEC:  Foreign  trade  in  textiles and clothing 
1958  and  1968 
($US  millions) 
EEC a  UK 
1958  1968  1958  1968 
Textiles 
Imports  722  2,635  238  555 
Exports  1,550  3,814  714  712 
Balance  +828  +  1,179  +476  +157 
Clothing 
Imports  164  1,210  55  258 
Exports  320  1,508  85  195 
Balance  +156  +298  +30  -63 
a  Including  trade  amongst  EEC  countries. 
Source:  UN  Statistical  Yearbook  of  International  Trade,  1958  and 
1%8. EEC  AND  UK:  PRODUCTION  OF SOME  MAJOR  TEXTILE  GOODS,  1958 AND  1968 
(thousand metric tons) 
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Total  EEC  UK There are  several  common  features  in  the  development 
of  textile  trade  in  the  UK  and  the  member  countries 
of  the  EEC.  Firstly,  most  imports  have  been  growing 
SO  to  100  per  cent  faster  than  exports.  In  the  UK  this 
has  meant  declining  trade  surpluses,  though  lately  UK 
clothing exports have found a new dynamism. In the EEC, 
especially  Italy  and  France,  the  low  level  of  imports  in 
1958  has  meant  that,  in  spite  of  their  higher  growth 
rates than exports, overall trade surpluses have grown;  but 
imports are becoming increasingly large and the surplus is 
already  beginning  to  decline.  Secondly,  trade  in  clothing 
is  growing about twice  as  fast as trade in textiles. Thirdly, 
the  deteriorating  trade  situation  is  most  marked  in  the 
"problem"  sectors,  cotton  and  hard-fibre  textiles.  Wool 
and man-made fibres,  especially synthetics, have maintained 
their  position  better. 
In 1958, trade between EEC member countries accounted 
for  much  of their  total  trade  in  textiles.  The  subsequent 
reduction of internal tariffs  meant that,  by  the end of the 
1960.s,  the  share  of  intra-EEC  trade  in  total  trade  had 
attained  its  maximum  of about  75  per  cent  for  imports 
and 60  per cent for exports.  Three-quarters  of its  remain-
ing trade is  with other industrialised countries. 
Developments  in  British  trade  have  been  very  extreme. 
From  about  1958  to  1962  imports  of cotton  textiles  and 
clothing  of all  fibres  increased  enormously.  The  increase 
was mostly due to growth of imports from Commonwealth 
developing  countries,  particularly,  India,  Hong  Kong  and 
Pakistan,  in  the  late  1950s.  Since  1932  Britain's  cotton 
textile  imports  from  the  Commonwealth  have,  under  the 
Commonwealth (formerly Imperial) Preference system, been 
admitted duty-free. Because of the growth in imports, Brit-
ain  gradually  began  to impose  quantitative  restrictions  on 
imports  from  developing  countries,  until  by  1966  all  such 
imports were so controlled. This has contributed to a virtual 
stagnation  of cotton  textile  imports  in the  last few  years. 
Even  so,  such imports from developing  countries  represent 
30  per  cent  of  domestic  consumption  as  against  only 
2  per cent in the EEC. 
Textile consumption 
Clothing  is,  after  food,  a  basic  necessity  of  life,  and, 
as  incomes  rise,  such  basic  needs  are  usually  satisfied 
by  a  smaller proportion of expenditure.  Recent experience 
in  the UK and the EEC suggests  that clothing expenditure 
is  not growing  quite  as  fast  as  total expenditure and that, 
moreover,  this  relative  decline  may  become  more  marked. 
Whilst the clothing industry has been able to minimise the 
fall in its share of consumption by making a more sophistic-
ated product,  the textile industry is  less  able  to do  this  as 
its  product is  largely standardised. It has  for instance been 
estimated for the EEC that the demand for textiles is only 
rising  at three-fifths  of the  rate of total consumption. 
Within  the  textile  industry  this  situation  varies  between 
different  branches  and  fibres.  Demand  in  most  branches 
catering  for  the  clothing  market  is  hardly  growing,  with 
the  major  exception  of  knitted  products.  Rising  demand 
for  spun  and woven  synthetics  to  some  extent  offsets  the 
stagnation  in  consumption  of yarns  and  cloths  of natural 
fibres  but, since these gains are increasingly at the expense 
of  natural  fibres,  prospects  for  growth  in  consumption 
of spun and woven  textile products are poor. 
In  industrial  textiles  there  have  been  some  setbacks  to 
consumption.  The  poor performance  of  the  jute  industry 
is  largely attributable to the use  of plastic  bags  or woven 
polypropylane fabrics. Hospitals, for instance, have replaced 
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some woven  textiles  by paper products. In other industrial 
uses,  such  as  tyre cord,  and in  household  uses,  especially 
carpets,  the  consumption  outlook is  however  considerably 
brighter. 
Geographical location 
The requirements  of the  early  mechanised  textile  indu-
stry,  proximity  to coal and  to  ports,  the need  for  certain 
humidity  conditions,  have  led  to  a  strong  regionalisation 
of  the  industry.  In  the  UK  the  bulk  of  the  cotton  and 
wool  industries  is  found  in  East Lancashire  and the West 
Riding of Yorkshire respectively. In Italy the cotton industry 
is  centred  on  Milan,  silk  on  Como  and  wool  on  Prato. 
Belgian textiles are concentrated around Ghent and Courtrai 
and Dutch textiles in the East Central part of the country, 
especially  around  Enschede.  In  Germany  most  of  the 
industry  is  situated in  three  of the  eleven  Lander:  Rhein-
land-Westphalia,  Baden-Wiirttemberg  and  Bavaria.  Overall 
concentration  in  French textiles  is  less,  yet  the traditional 
branches  are  themselves  highly  concentrated,  silk  for  in-
stance around Lyons  and cotton in Normandy, the Vosges 
and  the  North. 
Where  the  main  industrial  employer  in  a  region  is  a 
declining industry it is  hardly surprising if the whole  area 
reflects this decline.  North-East Lancashire for instance has 
some  areas  where,  despite contraction, the cotton  industry 
still  employs  half  the  industrial  labour  force.  The unem-
ployment  rate  has  never  reached  that  of some  depressed 
areas  in  the  UK  because  people  have  left  the  area  and 
women  have  left the  labour-force;  nevertheless  the decline 
of  the  region  involves  a  certain  cost  to  its  in1abitants: 
the  young  tend  to  leave  the  area  whilst  the  old  remain, 
and much of the area looks like a  grim relic of the  indu-
'jtrial  revolution. 
Textiles: a  declining industry? 
An extrapolation  of employment,  output, and trade and 
consumption  trends  suggests  very  poor  prospects  for  the 
oldest branches  of the industry at least.  A  continuation of 
the  past  decade  of  decline  in  the  British  industry  might 
mean  100,000  more  jobs  lost  by  the  end  of  the  1970s. 
The more recent  decline in the EEC textile  industry might 
mean  another 300,000  jobs lost  by  the  end  of the  decade. 
The developments of the  1960s have caused much public 
concern  and  government  intervention.  In  addition  to  the 
restrictions  applied  to  certain  imports,  there  have  been 
several  schemes  of public financial  aid  for industrial  reor-
ganization,  in  the  cotton  industry  especially.  The  largest 
of these  was  the UK Cotton Industry Act of 1959  whic~1 
set  up a  five-year  scheme,  jointly financed  by  government 
and industry, to  scrap and replace  obsolete and idle equip-
ment.  All  the  EEC  countries,  except  Belgium,  have  had, 
or plan,  similar  though  less  ambitious  forms  of  govern-
ment  aid.  France,  for  instance,  has  levied  a  very  small 
tax  on  textile  products  which  has  helped  finance  textile 
research  and  structural  improvement. 
There  is  no  great  conviction  that  such- outside  aid  has 
been  very  sucessful  in  arresting  decline.  However,  there 
are several  developments  in  the  industry's  structure,  tech-
niques  and  products  which  may  slow  up  decline;  others 
conversely  may  hasten  them.  These  developments  are  dis-
cussed in subsequent sections. The future of the industry 
The role of man-made fibres 
The versatility  of man·made fibres,  especially  synthetics, 
and their falling  price relative to natural fibres  has  helped 
them  maintain  levels  of production  in  the  textile  industry 
in  the  1960s.  However,  many  developing  countries  are 
beginning to produce or buy man-made fibres at competitive 
prices,  and  it  is  foreseeable  that  they  could  export  man-
made fibre  textiles  as  competitively as  cotton textiles.  This 
is  already  happening  on  North  American  markets.  Even 
so,  it is still reasonable to suppose that the major develo~ 
ments  in  man-made  fibres,  a  sophisticated,  science-based 
product, will  tend to be monopolised by industries in indu-
strialised  countries  and  that  for  reasons  of  proximity  it 
is  the textile industries in these countries which will process 
the  newest  fibres. 
In Britain  in  particular the man-made  fibres  industry  is 
exercising  a  vital  influence  on structural  development.  The 
contraction  of much of the textile industry since  the early 
1950s has forced the two largest man-made fibre companies, 
Courtaulds  and  Imperial  Chemical  Industries  (ICI),  the 
latter  to  a  lesser  degree,  to  become  financially  involved 
in  the  industry  in  order  to  secure  their  fast  dwindling 
outlets. This has led to a spate of mergers and acquisitions, 
largely  centred  on  the  cotton  and  knitting  industries  and 
either directly prompted by the man-made fibre  companies 
or as a defensive response by independent textile companies. 
As  a  result  there  are  now  four large  firms-one  of them 
is  Courtaulds and two of the others are at present merging 
under  the  aegis  of  ICI-accounting  for  about  half  6e 
cotton industry's capacity, and almost one third of knitting. 
The consequences  of this  development  are  far-reaching: 
the British textile industry is  becoming increasingly market-
oriented and rationalised;  the larger firms  are confident of 
their  future ability to  hold their own against imports. The 
failure  of the man-made fibres'  industry to intervene  on a 
comparable  scale  in  the  EEC,  or  indeed  in  any  other 
industrialised  country  except  Japan,  reflects  the  fact  that 
there  has  not been a  similar  contraction  in  textile  output 
elsewhere.  If such  a  contraction  were  to  occur,  the  man-
made fibres' industry might yet intervene in those countries. 
Technological  improvements 
As  in  most  other industries,  there  is  a  continued  effort 
to improve machinery output in the textile industry. Part of 
this  effort is  concentrated on improving work  organisation. 
It has  for  instance  been  calculated  for  the  UK  that  a 
reduction of the range of products within a mill  and longer 
runs  of  production  could  as  much  as  triple  labour  pro-
ductivity. 
There are also important labour-saving mac:1inery  devel-
opments.  Some  of  these  consist  in  improving  traditional 
tec~miques;  the  latest  looms,  for  instance,  weave  three 
times  as  fast as conventional looms.  Others consist in new 
techniques.  Perhaps  the most successful  of these  has  been 
carpet  tufting,  the  technique  of inserting  fibre  tufts  on  to 
a  preprepared  backing  instead  of  actually  weaving  the 
carpets.  This  has  greatly  cut  costs  for  cheaper  carpets 
and  helped  increase  production.  However,  in  many  cases 
much  of  the  improvement  is  swallowed  by  rising  wages. 
In the traditional spinning and weaving branches, therefore, 
the prospects  for most of these  improvements  of radically 
altering  the  competitive  position  of  high-wage  vis-a-vis 
low-wage  countries  must  be  accounted  as  small. 
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Developments in trade 
Several  developments,  actual  or  potential,  in  the  com-
mercial policy  of the  UK and EEC may greatly affect the 
amount  of  their  textile  imports,  especially  from  low-cost 
sources.  Firstly,  developing  countries  have  recently  begun 
to  export  large  amounts  of  man-made  fibre  textiles.  At 
the  moment,  though  UK and EEC tariffs  on  these  goods 
are  high,  there  are  no  quotas,  but the  great  pressure  for 
quotas from the textile industry, especially in the US, could 
quickly  alter  this.  Secondly,  the  UK in  its  application  to 
join  the  EEC,  poses  a  problem  for  the  harmonisation  of 
the  member  countries'  trade  policies  in  textiles;  this  f1ey 
have  yet  to  achieve  amongst  themselves.  The  UK  has 
already  solved  part  of  the  problem:  it  has  decided  to 
end Commonwealth Preference in cotton textiles and replace 
quotas  by  a  tariff  from  1972.  However,  the  problem  will 
then  be  posed  of  harmonising  Britain's  lack  of  quotas 
with  the  EEC's  often  very  restrictive  quotas. 
A  continued decline? 
Increased  advertising  and  fashion  consciousness  mig'1t 
increase  textile  consumption:  the  textile  industry  is  very 
happy to see the Midi and Maxi replace the Mini!  However, 
there  is  little  evidence  that  advertising  can  provoke  a 
dramatic  rise  in  the  long  term  in  the  amount  of textiles 
consumed  per person.  Given  this,  levels  of employment in 
textiles  will  clearly  continue  to  fall  simply  through  con-
tinued technological advance. If the rate of advance speeds 
up  or  if,  in  the  case  of  the  EEC,  imports  are  admitted 
more  liberally,  employment  will  decline  even  faster  and 
output will  be  seriously  affected.  Along  side these  portents 
of  decline  there  are  signs  that  part  of  the  industry  at 
least  has  a  healthy  future.  The  creation  and  enlargement 
of  the  EEC  may  eventually  lead  to  rationalisation  and 
structural  improvement  in  the  industry  along  American 
lines:  an  industry  catering  for  a  very  large  domestic 
market can cut costs drastically through methods of stand-
ardised  production  of  textiles.  Even  if  imports  come  to 
monopolise  the  mass  production  market,  the  domestic 
industry  would  at worst  continue  to  survive  in  a  reduced 
size  to cater for fashion markets and exploit new products. 
The  EEC  in  particular  has  to  choose  how  much  it 
should  protect  textiles.  The  defenders  of protection  argue 
that it preserves the jobs of lower-paid workers. Its oppon-
ents  argue  that  increased  international  specialisation  leads 
to  increased wealth:  lower-cost imports mean cheaper prices 
and  the  extra  earnings  of  the  exporting  countries  mean 
extra purchases from  the importing countries. The strength 
of  either  argument  rests  on  the  ease  with  which  labour 
released  from  textiles  is  able  to  move  into  other employ-
ment.  The experience of Lancashire suggests  that increased 
imports  have  not  been  catastrophic,  though  they  have 
caused some  problems.  The cotton area of Lancashire has 
gradually  diversified  its  economy  with  little  government 
help  and  there  has  been  the  long-run  advantage  to  this 
that many  former textile  workers  have been  able  to move 
into  better  paid  occupations. 
Clearly,  however,  the most socially  acceptable  and  least 
disruptive  kinds  of  adaptation  to  new  patterns  of  pro-
duction and trade may require public policies  to encourage 
new  job  opportunities  in  declining  areas  and  to  retrain 
labour.  This  aspect  of  public  policy  may  become  more 
important as  increased trade and economic integration lead 
to increased  international specialisation  w~uch in tum leads 
to  further  declining  industry  problems. European  studies,  II,  1971. 
The  European  Community, 
the  United 
and  world 
Kingdom 
population  trends 
In  every country, population growth is  an  essential element in  the development of 
consumption,  employment,  schooling,  the  burden  carried  by  the  working  population, 
etc.  That  is  to  say,  it  is  a  determining  factor  in  the  structure  of  any  society  at 
any  given  time.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  undertake  certain  minimum forecasts  in 
this  field.  Politically,  also,  the  size  of population  is  a  basic  factor  in  the  balance  of 
power.  Thus,  it  has  been  argued,  in  favour  of the  United  Kingdom's entry  into  the 
Common Market,  that with the  UK population of 55.6  million (1969  figures)  and the 
Common  Market  countries'  I88.I  million,  plus  a  further  11.4  million  in  Denmark, 
Norway, and Ireland,  the other three  applicants for  membership,  the community thus 
constituted would have a  population of 255  million,  greater  than  that  of the  United 
States of America (201.2 million) or the USSR (235.5  million). But will these proportions 
still  be  the same in  1980?  or in  2000?  Will  the  Community  of ten  countries  remain 
comparable  to  the  two  present  "super  powers"?  And if  we  also  take  into  account 
China,  which  already  has  a  population  of  some  750  million-i.e.  more  than  the 
United  Kingdom,  the  EEC,  the  USA  and  the  USSR  put together-,  and  the  Third 
World  in  general,  what place  is  the Common Market likely  to  occupy  in  relation  to 
world population as a whole at the end of the century? 
It is  not possible  to  give  an  exact  answer  to  these  questions  but  merely  to  set 
out the various elements at our disposal  for  arriving  at  an  evaluation.  Since  methods 
of calculation are of prime importance in  this  field,  we shall  first  analyse  the  working 
hypotheses employed by the experts engaged in  forecasting  population,  and the results 
to which they lead,  before proceeding to attempt a critical evaluation of them. 
Basic  hypotheses 
Projections and forecasts 
Three fundamental studies, the first published by  the 
United Nations 
1  and the other two  by OECD 
2
,  estab-
lish  projections for  the  years  1980  and 2000  based  on 
analysis  of population trends in the various countries. 
A  projection  is  not  a  forecast:  the  former  gives  the 
figure  which  a  population  shou!d  reach  by  a  given 
date  if certain  hypotheses  are  realized,  but  it  is  not 
concerned with whether or not these various hypotheses 
are  in  fact  likely  to  be  realized.  A  forecast,  on  the 
other hand, attempts to combine the hypotheses which 
are  regarded  as  most  likely.  It is,  of  course,  much 
more  arbitrary  than  a  projection,  but  a  projection 
as  it  stands  is  quite  useless  and  is  only  of  interest 
insofar as  it provides a  basis  for  a  forecast. 
On the  basis  of these  UN  and  OECD  projections, 
the  French INSEE (Institut National de  Ia  Statistique 
et des Etudes Economiques) has attempted to establish 
forecasts,  completing  wherever  possible  and  with  all 
necessary care, the hypotheses used  in  establishing the 
projections 
3
•  Care  is  all  the  more  necessary  in  this 
operation  in  that  demographic  phenomena  are  influ-
enced  by  a  very  great  number  of  factors:  rates  of 
birth,  fertility,  mortality,  abortion,  infant  mortality 
(neonatal  and  perinatal),  marriage  and  divorce,  the 
effects  of migration  and psychological  changes  which, 
contrary to  what is  sometimes supposed,  may be  very 
1  United  Nations,  Future  world  population  trends  as  estimated 
in  1963  (New  York). 
2  OECD,  The  development  of population  1965  to  1980  in  Western 
Europe  and  North America. 
3  INSEE:  The  prospects  of  the  Common  Market  and  the  United 
Kingdom in relation to  the development of world  population.  Prospects 
in  1980  and 2000.  In  Etudes et  conjoncture,  April  1968  (Paris,  PUF). 
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rapid: thus, in Japan it took only fifteen years from the 
promulgation  of the  1948  "eugenic"  law  to  halve  the 
crude birthrate. 
Range of estimates 
Taking into account these various factors, the United 
Nations draw up four projections:  the  first  assumes  a 
constant  fertility  rate  and  no  migration:  this  is  the 
so-called  "reference"  projection  and obviously  has  no 
predictive  value.  The  three  others  are  known  as  the 
high,  medium  and  low  estimates  respectively  and  are 
established on the basis of certain hypotheses rega,rding 
the  various  rates;  it  must  be  emphasized  that  the 
medium estimate is only one of a number of hypotheses 
and  that  it  is  not  more  likely  of  realization  than 
the  high  or  low  estimates.  However,  where  it  is 
impossible  to  decide,  the  medium  estimate  is  referred 
to  as  being  the least  ambitious  forecast.  The  medium 
estimate  is  established  on  the  basis  of  the  following 
hypotheses: 
•  mortality:  it  is  supposed  that,  in  the  developed 
countries, recent trends will continue much as  hitherto. 
In the developing countries, it is postulated that between 
1960  and  2000,  life  expectancy  will  rise  by 2.5  years 
every  five  years  up  to  the  age  of  55,  rather  more 
rapidly  up  to  65,  a  little  more  slowly  up  to  74  and 
not at all  after 75. 
•  fertility:  the  experts  are  unanimous  in  regarding 
an average decline as certain. In the developed countries 
as with mortality, recent trends are expected to continue; 
in the developing countries, the problem is  more com-
plex:  fertility,  according  to  the  experts,  may  decline 
by  50  %  in  the  course  of  thirty  years;  but  when 
will  this  decline  begin?  The  United  Nations  study 
recognizes  its  weakness  on  this  point:  "It  is  quite 
obvious  that  to  estimate  the  decline  in  fertility  at 50 % is arbitrary ... It is also open to argument whether 
the phase of decline in  fertility  will last thirty years:  ... 
(But)  this  is  unavoidable." 
Results 
The results obtained on the basis of these hypotheses 
are given  in  the  table  below. 
Medium  estimate  for  1980  and  2000. 
1980  2000 
millions  %a  millions  %a 
West Germany  60.5  0.45  65  0.35 
Belgium and 
Luxembourg  10.4  0.50  11.4  0.45 
France  53.2  0.75  62  0.75 
Italy  56.4  0.65  64  0.65 
Netherlands  14.0  1.00  17  0.95 
EEC  total b  194.5  0.60  219  0.60 
United Kingdom  57.2  0.45  62  0.40 
United States  240.9  1.45  319  1.40 
Eastern Europe  113.6  0.80  128  0.60 
USSR  278  1.30  353  1.20 
China  843  1.30  1,035  1.23 
Developed  areas  1,194  l.CO  1,441  0.95 
Undeveloped 
areas  3,136  2.20  4,688  2.00 
World  4,330  1.85  6,129  1.75 
% of world 
population: 
EEC  4.5  3.5 
Developed  areas  27.6  23.8 
a  Mean  annual  growth  rate  compared  with  the  preceding  20  years. 
Source:  Etudes  et  conjoncture,  No.  4,  April  1968. 
Cmde figures 
In the year  2000,  the  populations  of France,  Italy, 
West  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  will  be 
essentially  the  same  (62  to  65  million). 
At that date,  without  mentioning  China  which  will 
have  passed  the  1,000  million,  the  EEC will  have  a 
population of only  219  million  (281  million  with  the 
United  Kingdom)  whereas  the  USA  will  have  319 
million and the USSR  353  million. The importance of 
these  figures  for  the  Common  Market's  role  in  world 
affairs  at that time  is  obvious. 
To  be  more  precise,  compared  with  the  USA  and 
within its present boundaries, the population of the EEC 
was  20  %  higher  than  that  of  the  USA  in  1920, 
10  %  higher  in  1940,  while  in  1960  it  was  only 
95  % of the  US  figure;  if the  forecasts  are  correct, 
in 1980  it will be only  81  % and in 2000  only  69  %. 
Compared with  the  USSR,  the  decline  will  be even 
more serious.  Again within its present boundaries,  the 
population  of  ·the  EEC  was  83  %  of  the  Soviet 
figure  in  1920,  75  %  in  1940,  80  %  in  1960  (which 
is  in  no  way  due  to  the  vitality  of  the  Common 
Market population but is  explained by  the vast Soviet 
losses  during  the Second World War);  in  1980  it will 
be only 70  % and in 2000  only  62  %. 
Compared with China, the decline is  less spectacular: 
the populations of the present Common Market coun-
tries  represented  27  %  of  the  Chinese  population 
between  1920  and  1940  and  26  %  in  1960;  in  1980 
the proportion should be 23  % and in 2000 21  %. 
Thus in the year 2000  the population of the present 
six  Common  Market  countries  will  be  31  % below 
that of the  USA,  38  % below that of the  USSR  and 
79  % below that of China. 
Growth rates 
If we  examine  growth  rates  on  a  table  covering 
the  period  1920-2000,  bearing  in  mind  the  territorial 
changes  that have  taken place,  we  see  that the  world 
rate  rose  from  1.05  %  between  1920  and  1940  to 
1.85  % between  1960  and 1980  and that it is  expected 
to  fall  to  1.75  %  between  1980  and  2000.  In  the 
developed  countries,  however,  this  rate  remains  static 
at about 1  % and is  even  expected  to fall  to 0.95  % 
between  1980  and 2000;  but the  EEC,  which  belongs 
to  this  group,  shows  even  lower  rate:  0.6 % between 
1960  and 2000. 
This  does  not apply  in  the  case  of the  developing 
regions:  these experienced what has  become known in 
classic terminology as a "population explosion" around 
1950; their mean growth rate rose from 1.6  %  between 
1940 and 1960 to 2.2  % for 1960-1980 and is expected 
to slow down to 2  % for 1980-2000.  The mean growth 
rate  of  the  EEC  will  therefore  be  only  one-third 
that of the developing countries. Thus, while it repres-
ented  7  %  of world  population  in  1920,  in  2000  it 
will  represent  only  3.5  %. 
Finally, even within the EEC considerable differences 
are  observable  in  the  estimated  mean  annual  growth 
rate  for  the  period  1960-1980: 
Netherlands 
France 
Italy 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
West  Germany 
EEC average 
United Kingdom 
Source:  Etudes  et conjoncture,  April  1968. 
1.0  % 
0.75% 
0.65% 
0.50  % 
0.45  % 
0.45  % 
0.60% 
We  see,  finally,  that between  1920  and 2000  world 
population  will  have  trebled,  the  population  of the 
developing  countries  will  have  increased  four  times, 
while  the  population  of  the  developed  countries  will 
only  have  doubled  and  that of the  Common  Market 
will  have increased only by two-thirds. 
Such  at  least  is  the  outlook  which  emerges  from 
the given hypotheses. They should of course be treated 
with  considerable  caution,  given  the  extent  of errors 
in  past estimates  and the  difference  between  estimates 
made  at  nearly  the  same  time  relating  to  the  same 
date in the future.  One of the  elements  most  difficult 
to estimate  is  the  balance  of migration:  migration  is 
in  fact  quite  directly  linked  with  the  economic  s·tate 
of  the  country  migrated  from,  that  of  the  country 
migrated  to,  and  that  of  other  countries  insofar  as 
their  offers  either  of employment  or labour  influence 
emigrants. 
Critique and  revisions 
USSR and the Eastern countries 
The  present  fall  in  the  crude  birth  rate  is  more 
rapid and extensive than was estimated;  the rates used 
in establishing the medium estimate are therefore higher 
than  those  we  may  expect  if  very  recent  rates  are 
maintained. For these countries, the low estimate would therefore have a  higher degree  of probability than the 
medium estimate. Thus in 2000, Eastern Europe would 
have a  population of 120 million and not 128  million, 
and  the  USSR  would  have  316  million  instead  of 
353  million.  This difference  of 37  million  is  negligible 
for the purposes of comparison with the Third World, 
where  the population figures  are so  very  approximate, 
but it brings the USSR much closer to the USA. 
The Common Market countries 
In the  case  of the six countries  belonging  presently 
to  the European Economic Community the  correction 
should  be  made  in  the  reverse  direction:  the  birth 
and growth  rates  may exceed  those postulated by the 
United  Nations  in  establishing  the  medium  estimate. 
Recent development  of crude  birth  rates  in  the  EEC, 
the  UK,  the  USA  and  USSR. 
(live births per 1  ,000 pop.) 
Country  1950  1955  1960  1966 
Netherlands a  22.7  21.3  20.8  19.2 
Italy  19.6  18.0  18.3  18.9 
United States  23.5  24.7  23.7  18.5 
USSR  26.7  25.7  24.9  18.2 
United  Kingdom  16.3  15.5  17.5  17.9 
West  Germany  16.5  16.0  17.8  17.7 
Mean  EEC+ UK  18.1  17.3  17.9  17.5 
France  20.5  18.5  17.9  17.4 
Belgium  16.9  16.8  16.9  15.9 
Luxembourg  13.9  15.3  16.0  15.5 
a  Countries  are  listed  in  decreasing  order  of  rates  for  1966. 
Source:  Etudes et conjoncture,  April  1968. 
Examination  of  the  crude  birth  rates  given  above 
confirms  a  downward  trend.  This  has  disturbed  the 
various governments concerned: what will  be the effect 
of the efforts  made by the public authorities to  check 
this  phenomenon?  Obviously,  one  must  proceed  with 
caution.  It would  also  be  necessary  to find  means  of 
determining  whether  or  not  there  is  any  connection 
between expansion and unemployment on the one hand 
and population trends on the other.  Some, like Simon 
Kuznets,  hold  that  there  is  no  connection  between 
birth  rates  and  per capita  income;  but many  are  of 
the  opposite  opinion.  Mr.  G.  d'Herouville,  at INSEE, 
having  deplored  the  lack  of advanced  economic  and 
socio-psychological studies on this point, proposes that 
we distinguish between "the short term, in which unem-
ployment and stagnation  inevitably  make  their effects 
felt  (this  was  the  case  in  the  United  States  after  the 
great crisis  of 1929-1930  and  other examples  abound) 
and  population  trends  in  the  strict  sense,  where  the 
influence  of economic  factors  appears  to  be  less  cer-
tain". In the same line of thought, Alfred Sauvy places 
the accent on mental habits and psychological reactions: 
he considers that the  mind opposes population growth 
by  a  kind  of  defence  reflex  against  the  rising  tide 
of youth everywhere, a reflex connected psychologically 
with the fear of unemployment in the widest sense. 
But this decline, it must be noted, is only observable 
from  a  starting level  higher  than that forecast  by  the 
United  Nations:  in  fact,  the  forecasts  for  1960-1965 
were  17.1  % for Western Europe:  now the actual rate 
was  some  18  % and even  18.40  % for  the Common 
Market (18.2  % for France and the United Kingdom). 
These discrepancies  between  the  forecast  and the fact 
are due in  large measure  to  migration,  "no allowance 
having been made for this factor". 
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In the case  of growth  rates, a  fall in the  birth rate 
has not the same significance in the industrially devel-
oped  countries  as  it has  in  the  developing  countries, 
owing  to  the  decisive  effect  on  their  development  of 
migration.  Migration,  in  fact,  explains  most  of  the 
difference  between  the  rates  observed  and  the  rates 
forecast. There are, it is  true, certain exceptional cases: 
•  without  the  numbers  repatriated  from  Algeria  in 
1963,  the  growth  rate  in  France would  be  1  % and 
not  1.35  %. 
•  similarly, in West Germany, immigrants from  the 
German Democratic Republic were  very  numerous  up 
to  1961. 
But immigration to the EEC countries can be expect-
ed to remain high; since the Common Market is wealthy 
in comparison with  its  neighbours,  it should  normally 
continue to attract Spanish, Portuguese, Greek, Algerian 
and Turkish labour in particular 
4
•  In normal years the 
number of foreigners settling in France is about 210,000; 
allowing for estimated emigration, the surplus balance is 
some  160,000  per  annum.  In  recent  years  foreign 
immigrants  account  for  one  third  of  the  growth  in 
population. 
We  may  therefore  definitively  correct  the  original 
estimates  from  0.6  % between  1980  and  2000  to  a 
suggested  bracket of 0. 7  % to 1  %. 
In the case  of the  three  largest  EEC countries and 
the  United  Kingdom  which  are  closely  comparable, 
certain interesting details deserve  mention. 
FRANCE 
Estimates of total  population  (million). 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
without  migration 
48.2 
49.8 
51.7 
53.8 
with  migration 
48.6 
50.9 
(57.7) 
Population  growth  is  in  the  region  of  450,000  to 
5  50,000 per annum and the figure  for 1970 is  therefore 
in  all  likelihood  a  close  approximation  to  the  real 
figure.  More detailed forecasts for  1980 and 1985 were 
made in 1964 by INSEE. First without migration; then 
combining  two  basic  hypotheses  (  aeclining  mortality 
and  constant  mortality,  the  latter  having  a  reference 
value only) and three secondary hypotheses:  increased, 
constant and declining fertility.  The results are as fol-
lows: 
1980  between  51.9  and  54.7  million; 
1985  between  52.9  and  57.6  million. 
INSEE  then  included  migration,  forecasting  a  net 
immigration figure  of 150,000 between  1964 and  1969, 
and  130,000  in  1970;  combined  with  a  hypothesis  of 
declining  mortality  and constant fertility,  this  forecast 
yields  a  figure  of 51.43  million  for  1971. 
The national planning department forecasts a popula-
tion  of  between  65  and  70  million,  and  closer  to 
70 million, for 2000 and the land distribution authority 
has  used  a  figure  of 75  million  for  the  purposes  of 
an opinion poll.  In fact, in order to have a population 
of  75  million  by  2000,  France  would  have  to  have 
a  growth rate in excess  of 1  % (it is  currently 0.7  %) 
and a  migration  balance  of 200,000  per annum  (it  is 
around  160,000  at  present);  it  is  therefore  not  very 
likely  that  this  figure  will  be  reached  (moreover  the 
land distribution department has not published its work-
ing hypotheses). 
4  See  European  studies  No.  8,  Migrant  workers in  the EEC. Here  below  are  the  figures  for  the  population  of 
France in  the  year  2000  on  the  basis  of the  various 
hy.potheses: 
Natural growth I 
rate  (%) 
Without  I 
migration 
With a  net migration 
per annum in million 
of  0.1  of  0.13  of  0.20 
0.6  60.5  63.7  64.7  66.9 
0.7  62.5  65.7  66.7  68.9 
0.8  64.5  67.7  68.7  70.9 
1.0  68.5  71.5  72.7  74.9 
ITALY 
For Italy the medium estimates of the United Nations 
and the OECD projections are as follows: 
Year  by  UN  by OECD  actual populc1tion 
(million) 
1960  49.6  49.6 
1965  51.2  51.6 
1980  56.4  58.4 
2000  64 
Italian estimates present similar figures:  Livi  Bacci's 
study  published  in  1964  in  fact  forecasts  a  bracket 
of 55.9  to  58.4  million  for  1980  based  on birth rates 
of 1.84  % in  1961  and  1.46  % in 1981  and mortality 
rates  of 0.93  % in  1961  and 1.07  % in  1981. 
The  Centro  di statistica  aziendale  in Florence,  in  a 
study  made  in  1967,  produced  new  mortality  tables 
and new hypotheses of fertility and mortality: its projec-
tion  for  1981  proposes  a  bracket of 59.4-60.4  million 
which approximates to  the figure  suggested by OECD. 
For the  year 2000  the  Italians have no projections: 
if we  allow  60  million  in  1981  and a  growth rate of 
0.65  %,  the  figure  of 68  million  should  normally  be 
reached  in  2000,  but  the  rate  may  be  as  high  as 
0.8  % and in  this  case  68  million  would  be  a  mini-
mum. 
WEST GERMANY 
Estimates  of total  population  (million) 
UN 
estimate 
1960  55.42 
1965  57.75 
1980  60.50 
2000  65 
a  natural  growth 
b  with  migration  hypothesis  (1). 
c  with  migration  hypothesis  (2). 
OECD  Actual 
forecast  population 
55.42 
57.86 a 
58.24 b  59.04 
58.22  r.  59.04 
60.68 a 
62.45 b 
61.45 c 
It can  be  seen  from  the  above  table  that in  1965 
the  actual  figure  even  exceeded  the  various  forecasts 
made by  the  OECD. 
The  experts  have  therefore  been  led  to  raise  their 
figures  as follows  (excluding  migration): 
1970  60.27  million 
1980  62.79  million 
1990  65.80  million 
2000  69.88  million 
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The  breakdown  by  age-group  gives  the  following 
table  (in  %): 
under  15 
15  to  65 
over 65 
1965 
22.5 
65.7 
11.8 
1980 
23.8 
61.7 
14.5 
2000 
25.4 
62.6 
12.1 
It will  be noticed  that there  is  a  steady rise  in the 
percentage of children; the variations in the proportion 
of old  people  are  due to  the  war.  What disturbs  the 
German  authorities  is  the  fact  that,  while  the  figure 
for  the population as  a  whole  shows  an increase,  the 
working population will apparently continue to decrease 
up to  1975.  The economic repercussions  may be con-
siderable;  the  main  effect  will  no  doubt  be  the  dis-
appearance  of marginal  enterprises. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The main forecasts relating to the population of the 
United Kingdom are: 
1960 
1965 
1980 
2000 
Actual 
population 
52.37 
54.44 
Estimated population  (million) 
without 
migration 
54.37 
59.92 
with  I  with 
migration I  migration II 
52.51 
54.00 
57.25 
62.0 
54.40 
60.48 
As  in  the  case  of  West  Germany,  the  1965  figure 
exceeds  the high estimate. In the same year,  therefore, 
the  Central  Statistical  Office  published  the  following 
forecasts,  including  migration:  56.79  million  for  1970, 
61.42  for  1980,  74.66  for  2000.  It should  be  noted 
however  that  a  1966  poll  gave  a  figure  for  Great 
Britain  of  52.3  million,  i.e.  53.77  million  including 
the  1.47  million for Northern Ireland, "or almost one 
million less than the figure  forecast on the basis of the 
1961  census". But "this difference of some 2 % is attrib-
utable to incomplete lists of addresses for England and 
Wales". 
Against  the  75  million  forecast  for  the  year  2000, 
it is  argued that the mortality rate has  risen  in recent 
years  (11.3  in  1964,  11.5  in  1965,  11.6  in  1966)  and 
that instead of a net migration surplus, a  slight migra-
tion deficit  may be expected  up  to  1972.  Against this, 
it is  pointed out that the birth rate is  falling  less  than 
in  France  and  West  Germany and  that the  marriage 
rate  is  rising  (7.5  % in  1961-1963,  7.6  % in  1964, 
7.7  % in  1965,  8.0  % in  1966).  It appears  therefore 
that there is a chance that the figure  for the year 2000 
will  be  closer  to  7  5  million  than  to  the  62  million 
forecast  by the United  Nations. 
Conclusion 
Such are the present forecasts; it goes without saying 
the  Central  Statistical  Office  published  the  following 
that figures  are constantly under revision  in this  field. 
On the other hand, we  must not lose sight of the fact 
that  the  growing  awareness  of  population  problems 
both in government and among the population at large 
itself  affects  the  manner  in  which  the  various  rates 
evolve. 11 u 
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